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COMMENT
Drug Synergism and Potential
Medical Liability
SEDICAL MALPRACTICE litigation is currently of great interest
not only to the medical and legal professions, but to the gen-
eral public as well. The increased demand for health care services
by all segments of society, exemplified by Medicare,' will continue
to place a greater premium on the time a physician may spend with
an individual case. To cope with the rising case load, science is
continually developing new and more powerful drugs to allow the
physician more flexibility in his treatment.2  However, new drugs
can pose additional problems for the practitioner. Among these is
the possibility of synergistic interaction3 and its effect on both the
success of the therapy selected and the patient's overall health.
Traditionally the doctor has not been considered to warrant the
success of a particular therapeutic regimen. In the cases where lia-
bility has attached for adverse drug reactions, there has been suf-
ficent evidence to allow the jury to consider whether the injury was
at least partially caused by the physician's negligence.4 In order for
a synergistic response5 to drug therapy to form the basis of a negli-
gence action, it has been necessary to establish that the doctor knew
or should have known that there was a high probability that the
drugs being administered could produce potentially harmful effects,
and that he prescribed the combination of drugs through careless-
ness or failed to take adequate precautions to detect adverse effects
at an early stage.
142 U.S.C. § 1395 at seq. (1964, Supp. V, 1970).
2 Current antibiotic therapy for infectious diseases (e.g., gonorrhea, syphilis) has
greatly reduced the quantum of time necessary for the individual physician to devote
to the individual patient.
3 Synergism may be defined as "the cooperative action of two discrete, or individ-
ually distinct agencies or substances, which results in a total effect greater than the sum
of their two effects when taken independently." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Main, 383
F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1967).
4 Tozer & Kasik, The Medical-Legal Aspects of Adverse Drug Reactions, 8 CLINI-
CAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTIcS 637 (1967).
5 Substances may have a synergistic effect although not pharmacologically synergistic.
An example of clinical synergism "is the use of the vasoconstrictor epinephrine in a so-
lution of procaine hydrochloride for local anesthesia. The vasoconstriction diminishes
the blood supply to the area injected and thereby prolongs the time required for the
dissipation of the local anesthetic. Hence, the anesthetic activity is prolonged." J.
KRANTZ, C. CARR & B. LA DuE, THE PHARMACOLOGIC PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE 22 (7th ed. 1969).
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It is a well accepted fact in pharmacology that no drug produces
a single effect on a given patient.6 Side effects, which result from
drug interactions, have been a topic of much controversy within the
medical profession. For example, monamine oxidase (MAO) in-
hibitors' were introduced in the late 1950's primarily as antidepres-
sants, but MAO has caused surprising side effects.8 Other drugs
were found to modify the effects of MAO and these posed a serious
risk to the patient.9 This has lead to a renewed interest in the field
of drug interactions, motivating an increased amount of research in
this area.10This intensified inquiry into the interaction of chemically syn-
thesized drugs" is consequently expanding the information available
to the practitioner. With increasing frequency, articles appearing
in medical literature are not only outlining interactions between
specific drugs, but they are also presenting lists and tables of drug
interactions. 12 These strong, unexpected reactions, which may be
encountered when increasing or decreasing 3 drug therapy, may
provide a basis for establishing a physician's liability. A patient
may be able to recover damages for physical injuries sustained ow-
ing to the adverse synergistic reaction, the attendant pain and suf-
6 A. GOTH, MEDICAL PHARMACOLOGY 9 (5th ed. 1970).
7 Grosshandler, Henschel & Kampine, Toxic Reactions Due to Drug Synergism and
Antagonism, 47 ANESTHESIA & ANALOGESIA 345 (1968).
s "One of the serious disadvantages of MAO inhibitors is the increased likelihood of
adverse reactions to ingested foods and to drugs that may release monamines in the body.
The ingestion of aged cheese, beer, and certain wines has caused hypertensive emergen-
cies in patients who were being treated with MAO inhibitors." J. KRANTz, C. CARRY
& B. LA DUE, supra note 5, at 13.
9 "Chronic administration of furazoldidone [an antibacterial agent used in the treat-
ment of various bacterial and protozoal infections] causes a cumulative inhibition of
MAO and could predispose to a serious risk of hypertensive crises if an indirect-acting
sympathomimetic amine were administered." Solomon, Clinical Disorders of Drug In-
teraction, 16 ADVANCES IN INTERNAL MED. 285, 291 (1970).
'
0 See generally AMA Council on Drugs, Fixed-Dose Combination of Drugs, 213
J. AM. MED. ASs'r 1172 (1970); Bowles, Better Drug Histories Avoid Adverse Reac-
tions, 112 MOD. HosP. 128 (1969); Hunninghake, Drug Interactions, 47 POSTGRAD.
MED. 71 (1970); Interaction of Drugs, BRIT. MED. J. 811 (April 2, 1966); Jick, Miet-
tinen, Shapiro, Lewis, Siskind & Slone, Comprehensive Drug Surveillance, 213 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 1455 (1970); Soffer, Editorial, International Drug Fads and Clinical Vigi-
lance, 57 CHEST 213 (1970).
"1 Drug Synergism was added as a major topic heading to the INDEX MEDICUS in
1966.
12Hussar, Tabular Compilation of Drug Interactions, 141 AM. J. PHAEM. 109
(1969).
1 3 Removal of a drug during multidrug therapy may pose a hazard. As an example,
"phenobarbital promotes the rate of destruction of bishydroxy-coumarin and warfarin.
By this mechanism it increases the effective dose of these durgs for anticoagulation.
This becomes very dangerous when phenobarbital is suddenly discontinued without
decreasing the coumarin dosage. Severe hemorrhagic episodes may follow." A. GoTH,
supra note 6, at 616.
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fering, and the prolonged treatment necessitated. A physican is
normally held to the standard of care of the average practitioner in
his speciality in the locality in which the physican is practicing.
With the increased dangers to the patient flowing from the man-
agement of multiple drug therapy, the "locality rule" for the stan-
dards of medical practice may be insufficient to protect the physician
from civil liability.14
There has been a trend over the past decade to place the burden
for the risks arising from drug therapy on the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Prompted in part by the thalidomide disaster," the Ke-
fauver-Harris drug amendments of 1962' increased the testing re-
quirements of the drug industry for marketed drugs. The drug
manufacturers have correspondingly intensified their efforts to pro-
vide notice to the physician of the potential side effects that may be
expected with the use of a specific drug. Such notice has consisted
of advertisements in medical periodicals, personal correspondence
to individual physicians ("Dear Doctor" letters), and package stuff-
er warnings. The clear intent of this flood of information is to
provide a legally sufficient notice to the physician of the side ef-
fects of a particular drug.'7 If the doctor is on notice, he may be
able to look for symptoms of such side effects.' 8 This notice pro-
vided by the drug industry would tend to bar his plea of lack of
knowledge of the potential reaction, creating a higher standard of
care in his selection and prescription of the more dangerous drugs.
On its face, notice of potentially dangerous side effects of a drug
would appear to place the physician in a more informed position
from which to exercise his medical judgment. However, if this
type of notice is effective, then the overall result will be to shift the
pecuniary liability for adverse therapeutic results from the deep
pocket of the drug industry to the deep pocket of the physician.
The principal obstacle to this development yould appear to be the
same as that underlying the Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow 9 case.
Prior to the diagnosis of the plantiff's retinopathy, the drug company
had published indications of adverse side effects on its product cards
14Bruce v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Gielski v. State, 155
N.Y.S. 2d 863, 3 Misc. 2d 578 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
151d.
16 21 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. (1964, Supp. V, 1970).
17 Drug companies are apparently so anxious to notify physicians of side effects that
warnings may be issued on mere rumors of adverse effects. See Pearson & Salter, Drug
Interaction? - Orphenadrine with Propoxyphene, 282 N. Eng. J. MEn. 1215 (1970).
18 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
19Id.
19711
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and in the Physician's Desk Reference,2" as well as having circulated
a "Dear Doctor" letter. Despite the drug company's efforts, the
court held that the attempted notice was insufficient to have alerted
the physician. The court noted that general practitioners "receive
so much literature on drugs that it is impossible to read all of it.
• . . [Physicians are] inundated with literature and product cards
of various manufacturers [and] a change in literature and an addi-
tional letter were insufficient to present new information [to the
treating physician] . ' 21
An individual intent on suing a physician may be able to over-
come this question of effective notice by extending the doctrine of
strict liability in tort" to this area of adverse synergistic effects. For
a prescription drug, effective notice of harmful effects is satisfied
if the manufacturer informs the physician. The doctor may then
balance the benefit against the risk, using his own medical judg-
ment. Although a physician is not normally considered the seller
of a drug he prescribes, under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts23 this interpretation is possible if the medical
judgment factor is deemphasized.
Section 402A is clearly intent on establishing the liability of the
seller to the ultimate consumer of the product. Drugs as products
are specifically mentioned in comments j and k to section 402A.
When a drug manufacturer complies with the F.D.A. requirements
for notifying physicians of adverse drug reactions to a specific prod-
uct, he has done what is required by law to protect the consumer
in this regard. The physician may be protected against allega-
tions of negligence on his part for failure to heed the warnings by
reasoning such as that used by the court in Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Yarrow.2 4  The clear intent of comment k to section 402A is that,
20 Id. at 990. The court stated that, in that instance, notification by the detail men
would have been more effective. In Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr.
183 (3rd Dist. 1964) (reversed on other grounds), the court refused to dismiss the
drug manufacturer as a codefendant although the company had sent out two "Dear
Doctor" letters, had placed full page notices in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, and had placed a warning on all pacakages, labels, stuffers, and promotional
material as required by the Food and Drug Administration. However, the actions of
the detail men in not emphasizing the side effects to the physicians while promoting the
drug (chloromycetin) were sufficient to take the question of the company's liability to the
jury. Evidence of the company's profits on the sale of the drug was admissible to dem-
onstrate overpromotion by the manufacturer.
21 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, (1963).
2 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
23 Barring other actions on the part of the manufacturer such as overpromotion by
other means. See Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Dist. Ct.
1964).
24408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
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with proper directions and warning, a drug will not be considered
unreasonably dangerous. But at this juncture the drug has become
unreasonably dangerous through the physician's failing to note the
warning concerning the drug's use. There is in fact no medically
recognized risk for the physician to balance as he is unaware of that
risk. At that point, the physician is no longer exercising good med-
ical judgment for he is not considering all of the information made
available to him by the manufacturer and the government. If the
physician will not be held liable for failure to read and heed all of
the drug warnings sent to him, then he could be considered merely
a necessary conduit in the manufacturer's chain of distribution of his
product. As such, his failure in his new capacity to warn the cus-
tomer may establish his liability under the doctrine of strict tor't.2
It may be assumed that the amount of information available to
physicians concerning adverse drug interactions will continue to in-
crease rapidly as new drugs are introduced and additional research
is conducted. If physicians are hard pressed today to integrate
these additional factors into their daily clinical practice, they will
find the problem growing more acute as time passes. The attempt
by the drug industry to shift at least part of the burden for adverse
drug reactions to the practitioner through increased notification ef-
forts in all probability will succeed.
One possible solution to this problem would be to utilize avail-
able technology to shift at least a portion of the liability to a third
party and to simultaneously increase the quality of patient care. This
could be accomplished through establishment of a local automatic
data processing facility whose sole purpose would be the collection
and dissemination of drug information. This center would, along
with the members of the medical profession, receive all current ad-
visories published by the government and the drug manufacturers.
In addition, it would collect all published papers dealing with drug
interactions and side effects. The physician would use a multipart
form when writing a prescription in place of the currently used
25 This would place the physician in the position of either being legally responsible
for knowledge of all warnings issued and required by the government in the sale of dis-
tribution of drugs (much as an ordinary citizen is presumed to know the law) or lose his
status as a physician for that transfer. He would also become liable under strict tort
liability for failure to warn the consumer of dangerous side effects. In either event, when
the government and the manufacturers have done what is legally required of them to
notify of side effects, the responsibility for the management of the drug therapy is the
physician's.
An argument may be made that the results in products liability cases decided under
the doctrine of strict tort liability could have been more profitably decided under the
sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code with no loss of effect. See Shanker, Strict
Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 W. RES. L.
REV. 5 (1965).
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blanks. The top copy would serve the function of the current
prescription blank. The second copy could be used for his office
records. The third copy would serve as a data processing card. A
locally assigned patient identification number could be entered by
the physician in lieu of the patient's name. The card could be either
encoded by his office staff or forwarded to the center for encoding.
A similar card could be submitted for the discontinuance of a par-
ticular drug therapy. This system would provide a method by which
the physician could determine the status of a particular drug in the
context of a specific patient's therapy program prior to prescribing
the drug. The doctor would also establish in the computer a drug
history for each of his patients through the use of the encoded cards.
He would then periodically receive a printout sheet indicating all
current warnings in force and a synopsis of experimental findings
on the drugs and drug combination he was currently prescribing.
The center could be established on a county or metropolitan basis by
either the government or local medical societies. Use of such a cen-
ter for distribution of information to the physician could provide
him with current, detailed information relevant to his practice and
increase the quality of patient care.
The expanding demands for medical care and the increasing
number of drugs available for therapy will place progressively
greater demands on the skill of the physician. Every effort should
be made to insure that he has information necessary to exercise
sound medical judgment, for the law is placing increasing emphasis
on the proper exercise of that judgment. An error in therapy due
to unexpected reactions could lead to disasterous results for the pa-
tient and the physician. Such adverse results could be avoided
through the creation and use of a computer based system.
JOHN C. SLOVENSKY
[Vol. 3: 207
